Abstract: This paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network eects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have eects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network eects on trust and for the endogenous emergence of the network. The model also allows for characterizing the value of the network. We use standard assumptions on full strategic rationality. Testable implications of the model as well as model extensions are sketched.
Introduction
Theoretical and empirical research has established that social networks have important eects for micro-level individual behavior as well as macro-level social phenomena. This includesbut is not limited toindividual search behavior on the labor market and labor market outcomes (Granovetter 1973; , individual adoption and macro-level diusion of innovations (Coleman et al. 1966) , the spread of diseases (Morris et al. 1995) , social inequality (Lin 2001) , and also trust in social and economic exchange (Coleman 1990) . Game theory is a useful tool for modeling network eects. Research on games on networks (Goyal 2007, chap. 3; Jackson 2008, chap. 9 ) assumes a network and its characteristics as given and exogenous and analyzes network eects on individual behavior and the macro-consequences of such behavior. Raub and Weesie (1990) is likely to be the rst game-theoretic model of network eects for a social dilemma, namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma. Buskens (2002) provides models of network eects for trust problems. Buskens and Raub (2013) survey the theoretical and empirical literature on conditions under which networks facilitate cooperation in social dilemmas.
Often, actors can aect their position in a network and the network structure, at least to some degree, by forming, maintaining, or severing relations with others. For example, actors can often choose with whom to exchange goods or information and with whom to collaborate. Thus, networks and their characteristics will often not be exogenous. If actors have opportunities to choose their relations and if networks have important consequences for actors, there is an incentive for`networking'. Namely, actors will try to form relationships with an eye on optimizing their individual benets from the network: they will tend to strategically invest in forming and maintaining relations that are benecial and end relations that are not (see, e.g., Flap 2004) . Thus, the emergence and dynamics of networks becomes an issue.
Much of the literature on social networks has focused on eects of social networks. Systematic research on the emergence and dynamics of networks is more recent and has to cope with the problem that the emergence and dynamics of networks is inherentlyand even more so than network eectsdue to interdependent behavior of actors, thus complicating theoretical and empirical analysis (Flap/Völker 2013; Snijders 2013) . However, since the mid-1990's, progress has been made in studying the emergence and dynamics of networks, too. The game-theoretic literature on strategic network formation has rapidly developed in economics (see Dutta/Jackson 2003 for a collection of important and pioneering work). In strategic network formation models, links between actors are endogenous. These models employ assumptions about the benets that actors derive from being in specic network positions and allow for an analysis of how incentive-guided and goal-directed actors form, maintain, or sever links with others and for an analysis of the macro-level properties of the emerging networks. Meanwhile, a broad literature on games on networks as well as strategic network formation has become available (see Jackson/Zenou 2013 for a comprehensive collection of contributions and textbooks such as Goyal 2007; Vega-Redondo 2007; Jackson 2008) . Also, research in these elds has become very interdisciplinary with contributions from economics and sociology but also from mathematics, physics, and biology (see, e.g., Newman et al. 2006 for a collection of important work and Newman 2010 for a textbook).
If networks have important eects for actors and if actors can inuence these eects by forming, maintaining, or severing links with others, an obvious next step is the simultaneous analysis of both phenomenanetwork formation and network eectsin an integrated model. One then aims at a model that allows for deriving implications for actors' strategic network formation as well as implications for network eects on behavior. Flap (2004) has outlined a research program for an integrated analysis of both network formation and network effects, using the notion of investments in and returns on social capital. Models that actually implement such a program are referred to as models for the coevolution of networks and behavior. Such models are still very scarce. Examples in sociology and economics include work on cooperation in dynamic networks by Eguiluz et al. (2005) , Pujol et al. (2005) , and Vega-Redondo (2006; see Corten 2009, chap. 5 .1 for a survey).
In this paper we provide a simple model of network eects on behavior in trust problems and of investments of the actors involved in those trust problems in forming the network. We model trust problems using the standard Trust Game, a paradigmatic example of a social dilemma as well as a stylized representation of typical problems that emerge in social and economic exchange (see Buskens/Raub 2013 for review). Our model allows for specifying conditions such that the network fosters trustfulness and trustworthiness and such that actors invest in forming the network in the rst place. Also, the model allows to specify the value of the network for the actors. We assume full game-theoretic rationality with respect to actors' behavior, both in the Trust Game and with respect to investments in forming the network. The assumption of full strategic rationality is uncommon in models of strategic network formation. To keep the analysis tractable, models usually assume`myopic best-reply behavior'. This means that actors, when deciding about forming, maintaining, and severing links, do not take into account the implications of their decisions for future behavior of other actors and the repercussions of that future behavior for themselves. Full strategic rationality requires that such long-term eects are taken into account. In our model, due to its simplicity, the analysis is tractable under the assumption of full strategic rationality. We thus likewise contribute to more theoretical pluralism in research on strategic network formation.
We rst introduce our game-theoretic model. Subsequently, we derive implications for network eects and for network formation. We conclude with a summary of our main results, a sketch of testable implications for experimental research, and extensions of the model.
The Model 1

Embedded Trust Games
In our model, Trust Games are embedded in a game Γ. We wish to consider the simplest conceivable setting for network eects and network formation related to Trust Games and thus assume a triad with three actors, one trustee and two trustors A and B. Each trustor is involved in standard Trust Games with the trustee. The Trust Game (e.g., Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990; see also Coleman 1990, chap. 5 ) is depicted in gure 1.
In the Trust Game, actor 1 is a trustor and actor 2 is the trustee. The game starts with a move of the trustor. She 2 can choose between placing or not placing trust. If trust is not placed, the interaction ends and the trustor receives payo P i (i = A, B), while the trustee receives payo P. If trust is placed, the trustee chooses between honoring and abusing trust. If he honors trust, the trustor's payo is R i > P i and the trustee receives payo R > P. If trust is abused, the payo for the trustor is S i < P i , while the trustee receives T > R.
Assume that the Trust Game is played as an`isolated encounter' in the sense that an actor's behavior cannot have repercussions for future interactions (the actors play a`one-shot game'). Under standard game-theoretic assumptions, the payos in the game represent utilities for the actors, there is common knowledge meaning that all actors know that all actors know all elements of the game, and the actors are rational in the sense that they are able and willing to optimize their own utility. Under these assumptions, if the trustor would place trust, the best reply for the trustee would be to abuse trust, since T > R. Because the trustor can anticipate this, she is better o not placing trust than placing trust, since S i < P i . Hence, not placing trust, while placed trust would be abused is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. 3 Both actors would be better o if trust would be placed and honored, since R i > P i and R > P. The
Trust Game thus models a social dilemma in the sense that individually rational equilibrium behavior is associated with a Pareto-suboptimal outcome. likewise has an initial round 0 but we rst sketch the structure of Γ for rounds 1, 2,. . . . In each of those rounds, the trustee plays rst of all a Trust Game with one of the trustors and subsequently a Trust Game with the other trustor. It does not matter whether the two trustors play their games in the same sequence in each round. To keep things simple, we assume that each actor's payo function is the same in each Trust Game. We do not need to assume that the Trust Games are symmetric in the sense that R i = R and P i = P. We also do not need to assume that the two trustors have the same payo function for their Trust Games beyond R i > P i > S i for each of the trustors. After each round t = 1, 2,. . . of Γ, the next round t + 1 is played with a constant probability w (0 < w < 1), while Γ stops after each round with probability 1 w. Thus, actors play indenitely often repeated Trust Games and we can apply standard theory for indenitely often repeated games (e.g., Friedman 1986). Note that our assumptions imply that both trustors play the same number of Trust Games with the trustee.
By way of example, rounds 1, 2,. . . of Γ could be interpreted as business periods (for example, market days) in which two buyers in the role of the trustor purchase goods from a seller in the role of the trustee under conditions of asymmetric information. More precisely, in each period, each buyer decides whether or not to purchase a good from the seller and, if the buyers decide to buy, the seller decides on selling good quality or selling bad quality for the price of good quality. With probability 1 w, each period is the nal one in the sense that the seller stops business due to some exogenous contingency beyond his control (for example, a new competitor enters the market who oers a superior product).
In Axelrod's (1984) formulation, w represents the shadow of the future: with increasing w, actors' long-term incentives increase.
Investments in Network Formation
Rounds 1, 2,. . . of Γ are preceded by round 0. In that round, at costs, actors can form links between them that allow for information exchange. Thus, in round 0 actors can invest in network formation. An example would be that market participants set up a consumer organization or a buyer association keeping track of transactions. Links between buyers in the sense of information exchange about the behavior of the seller are then due to the distribution of information on the behavior of market participants by the organization. After round 0 has been played and given that the actors have formed an information network, taking into account what the consequences will be for the subsequent Trust Games, actors play a game on a network and we can study the eects of the network for behavior in those Trust Games.
Without investments For the trustee we assume that he is informed in round t ≥ 1 about the history of his Trust Games with both trustors as well as about what has happened in round 0. Thus, the network would provide extra information exclusively for the trustors but would not provide extra information for the trustee. For analytical tractability, we assume that all informationif available is correct. We thus exclude`noise' in the sense that, for example, an actor erroneously believes that investments have been made in round 0 or erroneously believes that trust has been abused in an earlier Trust Game.
The total costs of forming the information network in round 0 are assumed to be τ > 0. Dierent scenarios for sharing these costs can be conceived as dierent kinds of institutions: they are rules of the game in which the actors are involved (North 1990, chap. 1) . Seen from this perspective, we model eects of institutions for network formation as well as how institutions and networks interact in aecting cooperation in social dilemmas. The conditions derived below will illustrate that it might depend on the parameters of the game and the costs of investing in information exchange, whether actors are willing to invest in network formation under one or the other institution. Thus, our model allows for inferences on institutional design.
We consider two simple institutional rules for cost sharing. Under the trustorinstitution, only the trustors can invest. Thus, in round 0, the trustors decide simultaneously and independently about their individual investment. Each trustor can either invest τ 2 or decide not to invest. If each actor invests τ 2 , the information network is formed. Conversely, if at least one trustor decides not to invest, the information network is not formed. In that case, a trustor who had been willing to invest does not lose her own investment. This corresponds to common assumptions in models of network formation, namely, two-sided link formation (a link is only formed if both actors wish to be linked) with shared costs of links (Jackson 2008, chap. 6) . Our second and alternative institutional rule, the trustee-institution, stipulates that only the trustee can form the information network by investing τ .
Further Assumptions on Γ
We assume that round 1 is always played after round 0. Consequently, we assume that each actor's (expected) payo for Γ equals the sum of the realized costs in round 0 and the exponentially discounted payos in rounds 1, 2,. . . . This implies, for example, that trustor i's payo under the trustor-institution is Under the trustee institution,
would be the trustee's payo after having invested τ in round 0, while trust is never placed by any of the trustors in rounds 1, 2,. . . . In this case, U i = Pi 1−w would be the payo for each trustor. 4 We further assume that all actors are informed on the structure of Γ, that they know from each other that they have this information, etc. The structure of Γ is thus`common knowledge' (Rasmusen 1994, 44) . Finally, we assume that Γ is played as a noncooperative game in the sense that actors cannot incur binding agreements or binding unilateral commitments that are not explicitly modeled as moves in the structure of the game. 5
Analysis of the Model
We assume rational behavior of actors and are thus interested in specifying conditions for subgame perfect equilibria of Γ such that trust will be placed and honored throughout the Trust Games in all rounds 1, 2,. . . . We refer to such an equilibrium as a trust equilibrium. This approach is based on the commonly used assumption that such an equilibrium can be considered as the`solution' because each actor maximizes his or her own payo, given the equilibrium strategies of all other actors, and because a trust equilibrium is associated with higher payos for each actor than the situation where trust is not placed (see . Given our focus on network formation, we are specically interested in equilibria such that trust is placed and honored after formation of the network in round 0, whereas no trust is placed if the network is not formed. To specify conditions for such equilibria, we rst consider the subgame Γ − that is played after the network has not been formed in round 0. Subsequently, we analyze the subgame Γ + that is played after the network has been formed. Finally, we analyze conditions such that investments in the information network in round 0 are implied by equilibrium behavior.
Trust Based on Conditional Strategies
In Γ − as well as Γ + , placing and honoring trust can be the result of equilibrium behavior based on conditional strategies. When playing a Trust Game with the 4 Note that we interpret payos as cardinal utilities. Note, too, that the model includes discounting of future payos due to the probability that the game might end and that we neglect negative time preferences (see Rasmusen 1994, 108110) . It would be no problem to include negative time preferences and results would remain robust. 5 We assume a noncooperative game precisely because we wish to specify conditions such that rational actors will place and honor trust`endogenously' and without external enforcement, based exclusively on the embeddedness of the Trust Game in a sequence of interactions and the information exchange network between the actors. trustee in round t, trustor i can condition her behavior on information about the trustee's behavior in previous Trust Games. If i has information that the trustee honored trust in earlier games, i can reward this by placing trust. Conversely, if i has information that the trustee defected in earlier games, i can punish this by not placing trust. Thus, with T > R, the trustee has a short-term incentive to abuse trust in each Trust Game. However, he also has to take into account that abusing trust now may imply long-term costs in future games since no trust may be placed in at least some of those future games so that the trustee would then obtain only P < R in those future games. Anticipating conditional strategies of the trustors, the trustee thus has to balance short-term incentives (TR) and long-term incentives (RP ). Repeated Trust Games and, moreover, Trust Games embedded in a network through which trustors exchange information can thus have trust equilibria based on conditional strategies. Placing and honoring trust can then be a result of individually rational behavior of actors who take long-term eects of their present behavior into account.
What is the conditional strategy for trustors that is associated with the most attractive reward for the trustee if he honors trust and the most severe punishment for abusing trust? Such a strategy is commonly known as a`trigger strategy ' (e.g., Friedman 1986) . This is the strategy such that a trustor places trust if she has no information that the trustee ever abused trust and such that she never places trust again in all future games with the trustee as soon as she receives information that the trustee has abused trust. 6 Obviously, if both trustors use trigger strategies and the trustee always honors trust, trust will be placed and honored in all Trust Games in all rounds of Γ. If long-term incentives can at all be large enough to induce a trustee to honor trust, these incentives are certainly large enough if the trustors use trigger strategies. Conversely, if the trustors anticipate that the trustee will honor trust due to his long-term incentives, then placing trust becomes attractive for the trustors, since R i > P i .
It follows that an indenitely often repeated Trust Game has a trust equilibrium if and only if there is an equilibrium that comprises trigger strategies of the trustors and honoring trust by the trustee (see Friedman 1986, chap. 3 for details). We thus derive conditions for such equilibria in Γ − and Γ + . Note that the assumption underlying this approach need not be that trustors do indeed use trigger strategies. Trust equilibria do require the use of conditional strategies by the trustors but these conditional strategies may comprise less severe punishments than implied by a trigger strategy. For example, a trustor may be willing to return to placing trust if the`punishment period' for the trustee has been`long enough'. Nevertheless, the existence of a trigger strategy equilibrium is a necessary condition for the existence of trust equilibria based on conditional strategies that involve less extreme sanctioning and thus smaller long-term incentives for honoring trust. Hence, following a common approach in 6 A trigger strategy requires furthermore that a trustor will place trust in her rst Trust Game if she has by then no information about behavior in games of the trustee with the other trustor and that she never places trust again as soon as she or the other trustor has not placed trust in an earlier Trust Game (see the Appendix on why trigger strategies are dened in this specic way).
empirical applications, we assume that placing and honoring trust becomes more likely when the conditions for a trigger strategy equilibrium become less restrictive (see Buskens/Raub 2013 for a more detailed discussion of this approach in empirical applications).
Network Eects: Analysis of Γ
−
In a subgame Γ − that is played if the information network is not formed, each trustor is only informed on her own previous games with the trustee but has no information on what happens in the trustee's Trust Games with the other trustor. Our rst proposition provides the condition for a trust equilibrium in this subgame.
Proposition 1Trust without a network: Γ − has a trust equilibrium if and only if,
Proofs for our propositions are sketched in the Appendix. Note that T EMP − is a measure for the trustee's incentives to abuse trust. It is easily seen that 0 < T EMP − < 1. Proposition 1 reects the well-known result (e.g., Kreps 1990) that placing and honoring trust in an indenitely often repeated Trust Game constitutes equilibrium behavior if and only if the incentives to abuse trust are compensated by a suciently large probability w that the game continues. The proposition implies that placing and honoring trust is facilitated and becomes more likelyin the sense that the condition for a trust equilibrium becomes less restrictiveif the short-term incentive T R to abuse trust decreases, if the trustee's costs T P of no longer being trusted by a trustor increase, and if the continuation probability w increases. Note that the proposition implies that the existence of a trust equilibrium depends exclusively on the incentives of the trustee and not at all on the trustors' incentives. We will return to this issue in our concluding discussion.
Network Eects: Analysis of
+ is played after investments in forming the information network have been pledged and the network has been formed in round 0. Therefore, in Γ + , each trustor is not only informed on the history of her own interactions with the trustee but also on the history of the other trustor's previous games. Proposition 2 provides the condition for a trust equilibrium if the information network is available.
Proposition 2Trust in a network: Γ + has a trust equilibrium if and only if
.
In Proposition 2, T EMP
+ is a measure for the trustee's incentives to abuse trust, with 0 < T EMP + < 1. Thus, Γ + has a trust equilibrium for a large enough continuation probability w and for a small enough incentive T EMP + to abuse trust. The comparative static results for the condition in Proposition 1 also hold for Proposition 2. Also, T EMP + < T EMP − , i.e., the trustee's incentive to abuse trust is smaller in Γ + than in Γ − , since the trustee's abuse of trust in a Trust Game with trustor i can now be punished in future games not only by i herself but also by the other trustor. Therefore, the condition for a trust equilibrium is less restrictive in Γ + than in Γ − . This is in line with earlier research on network eects in Trust Games and related social dilemmas (e.g., Buskens 2002; Raub/Weesie 1990).
Network Eects: The Value of the Network
Since the condition for a trust equilibrium is less restrictive in Γ + , it follows that there are parameter congurations such that Γ + has a trust equilibrium while Γ − has no such equilibrium. This is the case if and only if T EMP + ≤ w < TEMP − . Under this condition, the network is valuable for the actors.
Moreover, we are now able to specify an upper bound 7 for the value of the network. To do so, we compare payos in a subgame Γ − without a network of information links and in the subgame Γ + with such a network under the assumption that a trust equilibrium, if it exists, will be played in the subgame Γ + , while trust will never be placed in the subgame Γ − if Γ − has no trust equilibrium.
Proposition 3Value of the network: Assume that T EMP + ≤ w < T EMP
− so that a trust equilibrium exists only in Γ + . The upper bound on the value of social capital is then equal to The upper bound on the value of the network thus increases if the costs R P and, respectively, R i P i of not placing trust compared to honored trust increase and if the continuation probability w increases, as long as the costs R P and R i P i and the continuation probability w are small enough so that Γ − has no trust equilibrium. Obviously, 2(R−P ) 1−w and Ri−Pi 1−w can also be interpreted as upper bounds on the costs of investments in network formation that a rational trustee and rational trustors would be willing to incur.
Network Formation
Having analyzed the eects of the network, we now turn to network formation. We do so by specifying conditions for equilibria of Γ that imply investments in network formation in round 0 and placing and honoring trust in all Trust Games in subsequent rounds 1, 2,. . . . Our proposition on network formation shows that rational actors will invest in forming the information network if their trust problems are neither too small nor too large. Small trust problems in the sense of w ≥ T EMP − can be solved without investments in network formation (see Proposition 1). Large trust problems in the sense of T EMP + > w cannot be solved even when relying on network eects (see Proposition 2). Trust problems in the interval T EMP + ≤ w < T EMP − can only be solved through network formation and rational actors incur the required investments if the costs are small enough and do not exceed the thresholds specied in conditions (4.1) and, respectively, (4.2). With respect to network formation, this is the core implication of our model.
It is useful to note that it depends on the parameters of the game whether an institution for cost sharing contributes to inducing network formation. The trustor-institution has the advantage that the costs of network formation can be divided among two trustors, while the trustee institution requires that the trustee covers the full costs. However, the benets must be large enough for each trustor to be willing to pay these costs. If the returns on investments in network formation are divided unevenly, it might be that one trustor is willing to bear considerable costs of network formation but the other trustor is not.
Discussion
Our game-theoretic model provides conditions such that a network of information exchange relations induces placing and honoring trust. Simultaneously, we have endogenized the network and have specied conditions such that actors incur costs to form the network in the rst place. Thus, we have integrated an analysis of games on networks that focuses on network eects with an analysis of strategic network formation that focuses on how networks emerge as a result of rational behavior. Moreover, we have specied the value of the network.
Our proposition on network formation shows that incentives for investments in the network are not restricted to the trustors who would suer from opportunistic behavior of the trustee. Rather, the trustee likewise has incentives to invest in network formation among trustors, although the trustee is himself not at all vulnerable to opportunistic behavior of trustors. In the Trust Game, the trustor's equilibrium strategy not to place trust provides protection against abuse of trust but the trustor cannot increase own payos through exploiting the trustee. Under the trustee-institution, only the trustee can invest in network formation and a rational trustee will do so when condition (4.2) is fullled. The trustee then sets up an information network for the trustors that enables them to update each other on the behavior of the trustee. Thus, the trusteè binds himself'. Through setting up the information network for the trustors, it becomes less attractive for the trustee to abuse trust because the future punishment of abusing trust increases. This, however, can induce trustors to place trust in the rst place, thus allowing gains for both trustors and trusteestrust is placed and honoredcompared to the payos they obtain when no trust is placed. Investments of the trustee in network formation can thus be seen as à commitment' that allows for placing and honoring trust (Raub 2004) .
Consider empirically testable implications of our model for lab experiments that allow for carefully implementing our model assumptions and for manipulating model parameters in experimental conditions (see for a survey of the meanwhile extensive literature on experimental tests of predictions from repeated game models, including games that involve networks of actors). Lab experiments require assumptions on how monetary incentives for subjects are related to the parameters of our model. We thus need assumptions on the subjects' utility functions or have to establish empirical evidence on relevant properties of their utility functions. Furthermore, we need to assume, as discussed in section 3, that the equilibria on which our propositions focus are`solutions' in the sense that rational actors tend to implement these equilibria. More specically, we need the common assumption that the likelihood of a certain equilibrium behavior increases when the conditions for the equilibrium become less restrictive. Our predictions then follow from our analysis of the conditions in our propositions. The predictions are on eects of changes in the parameters of the Trust Game, the continuation probability w, and the total costs τ of investments in network formation. Predictions refer to eects on investments in network formation, on behavior in the Trust Games, and on the relation between investment behavior and behavior in the Trust Games.
We can distinguish three scenarios. The rst scenario covers w < T EMP + < T EMP − so that trust problems are large. We predict a small likelihood of investments in network formation, while the likelihood of investments is only weakly associated with the costs τ . We also predict a small likelihood of placing trust and a small likelihood of honoring trust when trust has been placed. Also, the eects of investments in network formation on behavior in the Trust Games would be expected to be small.
In the second scenario, trust problems are of intermediate size such that placing and honoring trust presupposes that the information network is formed, i.e., T EMP + < w < T EMP − . We predict sizeable eects of τ on investment behavior as well as sizeable eects of investments on subsequent behavior in Trust Games. More specically, we predict that the likelihood of investments decreases with increasing costs τ . Likewise, we predict that investments in network formation have a positive eect on the likelihood of placing and honoring trust.
The third scenario has small trust problems, i.e., T EMP + < TEMP − < w. Just like for the rst scenario, we predict a small likelihood of investments in network formation, with a weak association between the costs τ and the likelihood of investments and small eects of investments on behavior in Trust Games. Other than for scenario 1, we now of course predict a large likelihood of placing and honoring trust.
Our model can be extended in various directions. In this paper, we have considered the Trust Game and the simplest case of a network for the Trust Game, namely the case of three actors, with one trustee and two trustors. In a companion paper (Raub et al. 2012) , we analyze the more general case with one trustee and n ≥ 2 trustors. Such a model allows for deriving additional implications on size eects, i.e., eects of an increasing number of trustors. A further extension would be to consider network eects and network formation for other social dilemmas than the Trust Game. In , we develop a model for n ≥ 3 actors that covers a class of paradigmatic examples of social dilemmas, including not only the Trust Game but also, among others, the Investment Game (Berg et al. 1995) , the Prisoner's Dilemma, and a 2-actor version of the Public Goods Game (e.g., Gächter/Thöni 2011). In addition to allowing for analyzing size eects, that model shows that the major implications derived in the present paper are quite robust in the sense that they hold also for other social dilemmas than the Trust Game.
Finally, a core feature of the model analyzed here is that the Trust Game is assumed to be a game with complete information and is repeated indenitely often. Together, these two assumptions greatly simplify the analysis. A considerably more complex model results when we assume incomplete information (in the technical sense of game theory, see Rasmusen 1994, 47) and nitely repeated Trust Games. In a nitely repeated Trust Game with incomplete information, the trustor cannot observe all characteristics of the trustee. For example, with some probability the trustee has no incentive to abuse trust (since T ≤ R) or has no opportunity to do so. The trustor knows the probability but cannot directly observe whether or not the trustee has an opportunity and an incentive to abuse trust. While the well-known backwards induction argument establishes that placing and honoring trust cannot be result of equilibrium behavior in a nitely repeated Trust Game with complete information, it is also well-known thatdue to reputation eectsquite some placing and honoring trust can be equilibrium behavior in a nitely repeated Trust Game with incomplete information (see for further discussion and references).
In Frey et al. (2013) we study a model with one trustee and two trustors, playing nitely repeated Trust Games with incomplete information and an opportunity for the trustors to invest in network formation in an initial round 0. The model is far more complex than the one in this paper but yields similar implications, thus again indicating that implications derived in the present paper for an extremely simple model are quite robust when assumptions of the model are varied. In particular, the model for nitely repeated Trust Games again implies investments in forming the information network if trust problems are neither too small nor too large. In addition, though, the Frey et al. model has an additional implication that enriches the theory of network eects and network formation related to trust problems.
Note that in the model presented in this paper, the conditions for trust equilibria depend exclusively on the incentives for the trustees and not at all on the incentives for the trustors. This seems problematic. Experimental research indicates, for example, that trustor behavior in the Trust Game depends also on the trustor's own incentives. In particular, the likelihood of placing trust increases when P i S i decreases or R i S i increases (e.g., Snijders 1996) . A reason for this may be that subjects in the trustor role anticipate that trustee behavior may not only be motivated by the trustee's own monetary outcomes but also by monetary outcomes of the trustor. In a Trust Game with incomplete information it is possible to account for such a possibility with respect to trustee incentives and for the fact that the trustor cannot directly observe those incentives. Then, the information network no longer serves exclusively as a means that allows for sanctioning trustee behavior in a game with trustor i also through future behavior of trustor j. Rather, the information network serves another purpose, too. Namely, via information on how the trustee has behaved in previous games, including games with the other trustor, a trustor can now also learn about unobservable characteristics of the trustee such as whether or not (and if so, how) the trustee's behavior is also aected by the trustors' payos. One can then show that the existence of an equilibrium with investments in the information exchange network, which induces placing and honoring trust for possibly many rounds of the nitely repeated game, also depends on the incentives for the trustors.
Our contribution employed formal and more precisely game-theoretic modeling of network formation and eects, including the assumption of rational behavior. Such models have assets in the sense of clear specication of model assumptions. Also, as we have shown, such models can yield implications that include testable hypotheses. Such models, though, also have problematic features. For example, they often include very strong rationality assumptions, including assumptions on Bayesian updating of beliefs, strong assumptions that actors can foresee very complex consequences of their decisions, and strong assumptions on what actors know about the network structure and their position in the network. A common approach in the literature for coping with these issues is to drop or at least to strongly relax rationality assumptions, for example, by adopting a pure learning model or by assuming myopic best-response behavior with respect to network formation rather than farsighted rationality. This easily leads to adopting dierent assumptions on behavioral regularities for dierent contexts which could be seen as problematic from a methodological perspective. Moreover, it is less than obvious, to say the least, that radically assuming away strategic rationality does lead to models that are better in line with observable behavior (see, e.g., Callander/Plott 2005; Pantz 2006; Berninghaus et al. 2012 ; Corten/Buskens 2010). Another approachless frequently chosen but the one chosen hereis to radically simplify the network by considering a triad and modeling network formation as a once and for all decision at the beginning of the game. Of course, a drawback of this approach is that one abstracts from many core features of network structure and dynamics. Still, the strength of this approach and its contribution to theoretical pluralism is that it allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network formation and eects under standard rationality assumptions. It would be interesting to also explore a third and in a sense`intermediate' approach that allows for more complexity with respect to network structure and dynamics than ours while assuming`some' but less than perfect strategic rationality. Such an approach is in its infancy but see Berninghaus et al. (2012) and Morbitzer et al. (2013) for some work in this direction (see Buskens et al. 2014 for a more detailed discussion of these issues and further references).
which is equivalent with w < T −R (T −P )+(R−P ) and thus contradicts the condition in Proposition 2. This completes our sketch of the proof that the trustee maximizes his payo by always honoring trust if the trustors use trigger strategies under the condition of Proposition 2.
To see that the equilibrium is also subgame perfect, it suces to note that a combination of trigger strategies implies that the trustors never place trust for the rest of Γ + as soon as trust has been abused or has not been placed once. However, never placing and always abusing trust always constitutes an equilibrium in Γ + as well as in all subgames of Γ + . Hence, the equilibrium is also subgame perfect. This completes the sketch of the proof.
Proposition 3 follows directly from the equilibrium payos in Γ + and Γ − under the assumption that T EMP + ≤ w < TEMP − so that a trust equilibrium exists only in Γ + and that trust will never be placed in Γ − . Namely, the payos associated with the trigger strategy equilibrium in Γ + are 2R 1−w for the trustee and The upper bound on the value of the network is equal to the dierence between these payos. Note that never placing trust need not be the only equilibrium outcome of Γ − when w < T EMP − . There can be equilibria of Γ − such that the trustee sometimes abuses trust, while the trustors always place trust, with equilibrium payos larger than Proposition 4 can be derived as follows. The subgames Γ + and Γ − always have equilibria such that trust is never placed and would always be abused in all Trust Games in all rounds 1, 2,. . . of Γ + and Γ − . Moreover, under the condition T EMP + ≤ w < T EMP − there is a trust equilibrium in Γ + but not in Γ − . A trust equilibrium is associated with higher payos for each actor than payos that are obtained when trust is never placed in all Trust Games in all rounds 1, 2,. . . . Under the conditions of Proposition 4, we thus obtain the following equilibrium for Γ. First, each actor who can invest in network formation does indeed invest in round 0. Second, both trustors never place trust and the trustee would abuse trust unconditionally in each subgame Γ − . Third, the trustors play trigger strategies and the trustee always honors trust in subgame Γ + . The question emerges why the conditions in Proposition 4 are sucient but not necessary for the existence of an equilibrium such that actors invest in network formation and subsequently always place and honor trust. Assume that T EMP + < T EMP − ≤ w. Then, a trust equilibrium also exists for subgame Γ − . Thus, investments in network formation are not necessary in round 0 for ensuring that a trust equilibrium exists in the subgame after round 0. Nevertheless, trustors could never place trust in Γ − and play trigger strategies in Γ + . Investments in social capital are then still consistent with equilibrium behavior under the conditions of Proposition 4.
